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PREVIEW—United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River
Preservation Association: Can the Pipeline Cross the Trail?
Alizabeth A. Bronsdon*
The Supreme Court of the United States will hear oral argument
in this matter on Monday, February 24, 2020, at 10 a.m. in the Supreme
Court Building in Washington, D.C. Anthony Yang, Assistant to the
Solicitor General, will likely argue for the United States. In a divided oral
argument, Paul D. Clement will likely appear for Atlantic Coast Pipeline,
LLC, the petitioner in consolidated case No. 18-1587, Atlantic Coast
Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association. Michael K.
Kellogg will likely appear for the Respondents.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case presents a narrow statutory interpretation question of
federal public land law with broad implications regarding state
sovereignty, private property rights, and the nation’s energy trajectory.
The United States Forest Service1 (“Forest Service”) and pipeline builder
Atlantic Coast Pipeline, LLC (“Atlantic”) petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari after the Fourth Circuit vacated a Forest Service-issued
natural gas pipeline right-of-way across the Appalachian National Scenic
Trail (“Appalachian Trail”) pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act2
(“MLA”) in favor of Cowpasture River Preservation Association and a
cadre of environmental groups3 (collectively “Respondents”). United
States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Association asks
whether the Forest Service has the authority to grant rights-of-way under
the MLA through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail within national
forests.4

* Alizabeth Bronsdon, J.D. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III
School of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
Federal petitioners, the United States Forest Service, an agency of
the United States Department of the Agriculture, Kathleen Atkinson, in her
official capacity as Regional Forester of the Eastern Region, and Ken Arney, in
his official capacity as Acting Regional Forester of the Southern Region, were
respondents in the court of appeals.
2.
30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2018).
3.
Respondent non-profit groups Cowpasture River Preservation
Association, Highlanders for Responsible Development, Shenandoah Valley
Battlefields Foundation, Shenandoah Valley Network, Sierra Club, Virginia
Wilderness Committee, and Wild Virginia, Inc. were petitioners in the court of
appeals.
4.
Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at I, Dec. 2, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587.
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Mineral Leasing Act authorizes “the Secretary of the Interior
or appropriate agency head”5 with “jurisdiction over [the] Federal lands”6
at issue to grant rights-of-way “for pipeline purposes for the transportation
of oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid or gaseous fuels, or any refined product
produced therefrom.”7 The MLA defines “Federal lands” as “all lands
owned by the United States except lands in the National Park System.”8
In 1968, the National Trails System Act9 (“Trails Act”)
established the statutory framework for the Appalachian Trail, which
traverses more than 2,000 mountainous miles from Maine to Georgia.10
The Act charged the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) with overall
administration of the Appalachian Trail.11 The Secretary then designated
the National Park Service (“Park Service”) as the trail’s “land
administering bureau.”12 The United States Forest Service (“Forest
Service”), an agency within the Department of Agriculture, administers
federal lands in the National Forest System, through which approximately
1,000 miles of the Appalachian Trail crosses.13 In 1971, pursuant to the
Trails Act, the Park Service and Forest Service agreed on the locations and
“the width of the right-of-way for approximately 780 miles of [the] route
within national forests.”14 The Appalachian Trail’s remaining 1,000-or-so
miles traverse a combination of state and privately-owned lands, under
appropriate easements,15 and other federal lands, like national parks.16
The Atlantic Coast Pipeline (“ACP”) is a proposed 604.5-mile,
42-inch diameter natural gas pipeline from West Virginia to North
Carolina.17 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
approved the pipeline in 2017 with twenty-one miles of the ACP’s
5.
30 U.S.C. § 185(a).
6.
See id. § 185(b)(3) (“Agency head” means the head of any Federal
department or independent Federal office or agency, other than the Secretary of
the Interior, which has jurisdiction over Federal lands”).
7.
Id. § 185(a).
8.
See id. § 185(b)(1) (emphasis added).
9.
16 U.S.C. § 1241–1249 (2018).
10. Id. § 1244(a)(1).
11. Id.
12. Br. for Resp’ts at 5, Jan. 15, 2020, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587; see
34 Fed. Reg. 14,337, 14,337 (Sept. 12, 1969).
13. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 11.
14. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 10.
15. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 9 (citing Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,
Trails for America: Report on the Nationwide Trail Study, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR 26 (1966) https://go.usa.gov/xpKnp); see S. REP. NO. 1233, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1968) (stating that agencies should “obtain scenic or other easements
for rights-of-way necessary for the . . . public use of the trail, and the protection
of the scenic and other qualities of the trail”).
16. See Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 8–9.
17. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150,
155 (2018).
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proposed route crossing the George Washington and Monongahela
national forests.18 Atlantic submitted plans that include clear-cutting a
125-foot right-of-way for most of that distance, digging a trench to bury
the pipeline, and blasting and flattening ridgelines across mountainous
terrain, directly impacting nearly 12,000 acres of national forest.19 To
cross the Appalachian Trail, Atlantic proposed drilling a one-mile-long
hole approximately 700 feet beneath the surface of a 0.1-mile stretch of
trail.20 In January 2018, the Forest Service issued Atlantic a right-of-way
and special-use permit for the ACP to cross two national forests under
perceived MLA authority.21
Following administrative appeals, Respondents petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit alleging violations
of the MLA, the National Environmental Policy Act22 (“NEPA”), and the
National Forest Management Act23 (“NFMA”) for the Forest Service’s
failure to comply with its 2012 Forest Planning Rule and 2016 Planning
Rule amendments.24 The Fourth Circuit held that the Forest Service had
violated NEPA and NFMA, and because the trail is administered by the
Secretary of the Interior as part of the National Park System, “the Forest
Service [did] not have statutory authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way
across the [Appalachian Trial] pursuant [to] the MLA.”25
The Fourth Circuit denied an en banc rehearing on February 25,
2019. On June 25, 2019, the Forest Service and Atlantic petitioned for
certiorari. The Supreme Court of the United States granted the petitions
and consolidated the cases on October 4, 2019. The sole issue before the
Court is whether the Forest Service has authority under the MLA to grant
rights-of-way through lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The parties disagree about whether the Forest Service has the
authority to grant rights-of-way across the Appalachian Trail. Petitioners
contend that national forest lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail
remain in the National Forest System and the Forest Service has statutory
authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way through national forest lands.
Respondents argue that the Appalachian Trail is a unit of the National Park
System and the MLA excludes all federal lands in the National Park
System. Therefore, a pipeline cannot cross federal land within the National
Park System without congressional authorization.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 12, Dec. 2, 2019, No. 18-1587; Fed.
Pet’rs’ Pet. for Cert. at 7, June 25, 2019, No. 18-1584.
21. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 160.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4361 (2018).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2018).
24. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 161; see also Planning Rule, 77 Fed.
Reg. 21,162 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric. April 9, 2012); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.8–219.11.
25. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 181.
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A. The Forest Service’s Arguments
The Forest Service contends the MLA’s exclusion for “lands in
the National Park System” does not apply in this case because the
“National Park System” definition only encompasses (1) areas of “land”
(or “water”) that are (2) “administered” by the Secretary of the Interior,
acting through the Park Service.26 The Forest Service claims the Trails Act
defines the Appalachian Trail as a “footpath,” or “trail”—but not “land”—
and the authority to administer the trail is different than the authority to
administer the lands traversed by the trail.27 The Forest Service relies upon
the Week’s Act,28 which solidified its administrative jurisdiction over all
national forest lands when it “permanently reserved, held, and
administered” the federal lands at issue “as national forest lands.”29 The
Forest Service argues that federal lands traversed by the Appalachian Trail
remain under the administrative jurisdiction of other federal agencies.30
The Forest Service claims that where Congress intended to transfer
administrative jurisdiction over federal land from one agency to another,
it has done so clearly in the statutory text.31 Because the Trails Act does
not provide for agency land “transfer[s],” the Forest Service argues that it
is the appropriate authority to grant an underground pipeline right-of-way
through federal lands in a national forest under the MLA, even when those
lands are traversed by the Appalachian Trail.32
26. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 21 (“The ‘National Park System’ includes
‘any area of land and water administered by the Secretary, acting through the
Director [of the Park Service], for park, monument, historic, parkway,
recreational, or other purposes.”) (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100102(2), 100501 (Supp.
V 2017) (enacted 2014)); see 16 U.S.C. § 1(a) (1970) (materially similar; repealed
2014)).
27. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 17, 19 (“Congress spoke clearly in the Trails
Act: The Appalachian Trail is ‘a trail’—not land—and the Act directs the
Secretary of the Interior only to ‘administer[]’ the ‘trail’ primarily as a ‘footpath.’
16 U.S.C. 1244(a)(1).”) (“Congress expressly provided in the Trails Act that its
assignment of ‘overall administration of a trail’ across the surface of lands does
not ‘transfer among Federal agencies any management responsibilities established
under any other law for federally administered lands.’ 16 U.S.C. 1246(a)(1)(A)
(emphases added).”).
28. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 5 (“In 1918, President Woodrow Wilson
established [the George Washington National Forest] . . . pursuant to the Weeks
Act, which provides that the relevant lands ‘shall be permanently reserved, held,
and administered as national forest lands’ . . . .”) (internal citations omitted)); 16
U.S.C. § 521 (2018).
29. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 20 (“The Secretary of Agriculture is vested
with administrative ‘jurisdiction of the national forests,’ United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 709 n.18 (1978); see 16 U.S.C. 472, and the Secretary has
delegated to the Forest Service that authority to ‘administer[] and manage[]’ the
federal ‘land in the National Forests,’ 36 C.F.R. 200.3(b)(2)).”); 16 U.S.C. § 521.
30. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 30.
31. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 17.
32. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 16–17.
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The Forest Service further contends that the Secretary’s
responsibility for the “overall administration” of the trail33 “quite plainly
does not grant authority to the Secretary to administer all of the state, local,
and private ‘lands’ that the Trail traverses.”34 In fact, it claims Congress’s
language in the Trails Act indicates the Secretary’s limited authority is
based on the need to “insure continuity” of the route and to “coordinate
the efforts of the participating [federal and state] agencies.”35
Critically, the Forest Service maintains the Fourth Circuit’s ruling
would significantly alter the legal framework governing public land
administration within national parks and national monuments.36 It argues
that interpreting the Trails Act as the Fourth Circuit suggests would require
transferring administrative jurisdiction over all state, private and federal
lands beneath a nationally designated trail—an “obviously incorrect”
conclusion—with the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail (“Pacific Crest
Trail”) underscoring that point.37
The Pacific Crest Trail is a national trail that extends
approximately 2,350 miles “from the Mexican-California border
northward generally along the mountain ranges of the west coast States to
the Canadian-Washington border.”38 At its inception, the Trails Act
granted the Secretary of the Interior the authority to administer the
Appalachian Trail and the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to
administer the Pacific Crest Trail.39 Under the Fourth Circuit’s logic, the
Forest Service argues that grant of authority would have consequentially
removed the land beneath the Pacific Crest Trail from the National Park
System.40 Taken to its logical conclusion, the Forest Service argues this
would authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to grant pipeline rights-ofway pursuant to the MLA under the route of the Pacific Crest Trail through
national parks and national monuments.41
Finally, the Forest Service contends the logic of the Fourth
Circuit’s decision would effectuate a “sweeping prohibition against
pipeline rights-of-ways under the MLA for all federally owned land
crossed by the roughly 2000-mile-long Appalachian Trail.”42

33. 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A).
34. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 34.
35. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 35 (citing Bureau of Outdoor Recreation,
Trails for America: Report on the Nationwide Trail Study, U.S. DEP’T OF THE
INTERIOR 25, 32 (1966), https://go.usa.gov/xpKnp).
36. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36.
37. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36, 40.
38. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36; 16 U.S.C. § 1244(a)(2); see 16 U.S.C. §
1241(b).
39. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1244(a)(2), 1246(a)(1)(A).
40. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 37; cf. 54 U.S.C. § 100102(2), 100501 (Supp.
V. 2017) (defining “National Park System” as the areas of land or water
“administered” by the Secretary of the Interior though the Park Service).
41. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 37; see 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(a), (b)(1).
42. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 41.
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B. Atlantic’s Arguments
Atlantic’s argument hinges on similar statutory interpretation and
the premise that overall administrative authority and administration or
jurisdiction over federal lands are not the same.43 Atlantic claims that
although the Trails Act designates administrative authority over the
Appalachian Trail footpath itself, it does not divest federal agencies of
ownership or jurisdiction over the federal lands through which the trail
passes.44 Moreover, Atlantic argues an agency’s responsibility to
administer a national trail should not displace the jurisdiction of other
federal agencies over the federal lands, and agencies have historically
understood that it does not.45 Supporting its claim, Atlantic points to §
1246(a)(1)(A) of the Trails Act, which states that “[n]othing contained in
[the Act] shall be deemed to transfer among Federal agencies any
management responsibilities established under any other law for federally
administered lands.”46
Comparing the Trails Act to the National Wild and Scenic Rivers
47
Act (“Rivers Act”), which Congress enacted on the same day in 1968,
Atlantic contends Congress “knew how to effect a land transfer between
federal agencies and did not do so in the Trails Act.”48 Atlantic argues the
Rivers Act differs from the Trails Act in several key respects. First, while
the Trails Act empowers the Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture to
negotiate rights-of-way for national trails, the Rivers Act authorizes them
to acquire federal lands49 and “transfer to the appropriate secretary
jurisdiction over such lands.”50 Crucially, Atlantic claims the Rivers Act
specifies that if the lands are transferred to the Secretary of Agriculture,
then the lands “shall upon such acquisition or transfer become national
forest lands.”51 On the other hand, “[a]ny component of the national wild
and scenic rivers system that is administered by the Secretary of the
Interior through the National Park Service shall become a part of the
national park system.”52 Thus, Atlantic maintains that under the Trails Act,
the Secretary selected and negotiated rights-of-way to create the trail, but
the state and private lands he selected did not consequently become federal
lands when they were designated part of the trail’s route.53
Illustrating this idea, Atlantic points to the Appalachian Trail
itself, which traverses sixty state game lands, forests, and parks; one
national wildlife refuge; six national parks; eight national forests; and
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 18.
Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 20.
Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 49.
Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 2.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287 (2018).
Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 18.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1277.
Id. § 1277(e).
Id.
Id. § 1281(c).
Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 24.

2019 PREVIEW: USFS V. COWPASTURE RIVER PRES. ASS’N

7

privately held lands.54 Atlantic notes days after enacting the Trails Act and
designating the Appalachian Trail as a footpath to be administered by the
Secretary, Congress extended the Blue Ridge Parkway, and in doing so,
directed the Secretary to “relocate and reconstruct portions of the
Appalachian Trail . . . that may be disturbed by the parkway extension . .
. upon national forest lands with the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture.”55 Atlantic argues Congress expressly gave the Park Service
authority to grant rights-of-way through the Blue Ridge Parkway, thus
ensuring that the Parkway “would not be a 469-mile barrier to
development.”56 Atlantic contends that if Congress intended the Trails Act
to place an impermeable wall between western resources and the coast, it
would not have included such specific language when it created the Blue
Ridge Parkway.57
Finally, Atlantic maintains the Fourth Circuit’s decision produces
illogical results, which are inconsistent with land management to date.58
As examples, Atlantic cites a Forest Service regulation, a directors order,
a department manual, an Environmental Assessment, and a Record of
Decision—all demonstrating the Park Service’s unambiguous
understanding that the Appalachian Trail is “multi-jurisdictional,” with
only select “segments of the trail under the primary land management
responsibility of the National Park Service.”59 In addition to the more than
fifty pipelines that currently cross national forest lands beneath the
Appalachian Trail, Atlantic claims the Forest Service has granted rightsof-way for electrical transmission lines, telecommunications sites,
municipal water facilities, roads, and grazing areas.60
Atlantic concludes that because the Trails Act did not divest the
Forest Service of its jurisdiction over the land beneath the Appalachian
Trail, as Respondents contend and the Fourth Circuit held, the Forest
Service has clear statutory authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way under
the MLA.61 To hold otherwise, Atlantic claims, would constitute a massive
land transfer between federal agencies and stifle much-needed energy and
infrastructure development.62

54. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 24.
55. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 31 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 460a-7(3) (2018)
(emphasis added by Atlantic)).
56. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 22.
57. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 18.
58. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 19.
59. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 34; 48 Fed. Reg. 30,253 (June 30, 1983);
Director’s Order No. 45: National Trails System 6–8 (2013); Dep’t of the Interior,
710 Department Manual 1.4(C)(4) (1977); FERC, Giles Cty. Project Envtl.
Assessment, Dkt. No. CP13-125-000 (Nov. 2013), at *5; Dep’t of Agric.,
Mountain Valley Pipeline Project Record of Decision (Dec. 2017), *22–24,
available at https://bit.ly/35fkn2k.
60. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 49.
61. Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 11.
62. See Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 43, 48.
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C. Respondents’ Arguments
Respondents’ alternative interpretation suggests that as a “unit” of
the National Park System,63 the entire Appalachian Trail corridor is
outside the scope of the MLA.64 Respondents contend the Trails Act, the
National Park Service Organic Act65 (“Organic Act”), as well as legislative
history and agency publications, confirm the Park Service’s administration
over the Appalachian Trail, which is among “lands in the National Park
System” and thus exempt from agency approval pursuant to the MLA.66
Respondents argue Congress’s directive for the Park Service to administer
lands “in such a manner and by such means as will leave [it] unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations”67 leaves no question of intent.68
Therefore, Respondents maintain, Congress clearly and intentionally
required its “direct” and “specific” approval for pipeline rights-of-way
over lands in the National Park System.69
Respondents contend Petitioners mistakenly distinguish between
“footpath” and “land” to further their argument that the trail is only a rightof-way and not a “unit” of the National Park System.70 Respondents argue
this is an illogical distinction because “neither the Trails Act nor the
Organic Act distinguishes between ‘land’ and ‘footpaths’ any more than
they distinguish between ‘land’ and the various monuments, historic
buildings, parkways, and recreation areas that are also units of the National
Park System.”71 Congress’s use of the term “footpath,” they argue, means
only that the trail is “intended primarily for use by pedestrians, as opposed
to mountain bikers or ATV drivers.”72
Respondents claim the Trails Act carefully distinguishes between
trail “administration” and “management” of trail segments.73 The entire
Appalachian Trail is “administered” by the Secretary, who delegated that

63. Br. for Resp’ts at 2, 24 (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100102(6) (“Lands
administered by the Park Service are defined as Park “System unit[s].”)).
64. Br. for Resp’ts at 14 (citing 30 U.S.C. § 185(b)(1) (“Federal
lands” means all lands owned by the United States except lands in the National
Park System.”)).
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1–18(f) (2018).
66. Br. for Resp’ts at 5 (“The Organic Act that established the System
in 1916 now defines it as ‘any area of land and water administered by the
Secretary, acting through the [Park Service] Director, for park, monument,
historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes.’”) (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100501)).
67. Br. for Resp’ts at 3; 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a).
68. Br. for Resp’ts at 15.
69. Br. for Resp’ts at 6 (“The Park Service’s authorities ‘shall be
construed . . . in light of’ and not ‘exercised in derogation of the values and
purposes for which the System units have been established, except as directly and
specifically provided by Congress.’”) (citing 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(2)).
70. Br. for Resp’ts at 2.
71. Br. for Resp’ts at 3.
72. Br. for Resp’ts at 3.
73. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33, Aug. 28, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587.
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authority to the Park Service.74 Under Respondents’ theory, the Trails Act
assigns different roles to agencies that administer land surrounding a trail
(“administering lands through which the trail route passes”),75 agencies
that manage trail segments (“management responsibilities”),76 and trail
administers (“administering and managing the trail”).77 Administration,
Respondents maintain, encompasses duties such as selecting, acquiring,
and regulating the land that makes up the trail.78 While they acknowledge
the administrator can transfer “management” responsibility for segments
to other agencies, Respondents argue he cannot transfer congressionally
assigned “administration” of the entire trail.79
Respondents contend that, because in administering National Park
System units such as the Appalachian Trail the Park Service is prohibited
from exercising its authority “in derogation of the values and purposes for
which the System units have been established,”80 the plain statutory text
of the MLA logically precludes agency approval across national park lands
for pipelines carrying toxic oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid or gaseous
fuels.81 Thus, Respondents assert that oil and gas pipelines can only obtain
new rights-of-way across federal lands in the National Park System
through case-by-case legislation.82
Finally, Respondents push back against Petitioners’ policy
arguments, pointing out that new pipelines can cross the Appalachian Trail
on state or private land, and also across federals lands with existing
easements, which are unaffected by the MLA.83 Criticizing another of
Petitioners’ arguments, Respondent’s argue the Fourth Circuit’s decision
in this case does nothing to obstruct or prohibit other essential
infrastructure across national park lands because Congress granted the
74. Br. for Resp’ts at 5 (“The Trails Act left ownership and day-today management of Trail lands with existing owners rather than condemning
those lands for federal ownership . . . But Congress charged the Secretary of the
Interior (the ‘Secretary’) with the ‘administ[ration]’ of the entire Trail, no matter
who owns the land. The Secretary in turn designated the Park Service as the
Trail’s ‘land administering bureau.’” (internal citations omitted)); see 16 U.S.C.
§ 1244(a)(1); 34 Fed. Reg. 14,337, 14,337 (Sept. 12, 1969).
75. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(d)(1)).
76. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)).
77. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(A)).
78. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 3 (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(a)–(c), (h)–
(i)).
79. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 33 (quoting16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(1)(B)).
80. Br. for Resp’ts at 6; 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(2).
81. Br. for Resp’ts at 14; see 30 U.S.C. §§ 185(a)–(b)(1).
82. Br. for Resp’ts 7–8 (“Congress has authorized pipeline rights-ofway crossing System units ‘at Denali National Park, Glacier National Park, Great
Smoky Mountains and Gateway National Recreation Area.’”) (citing Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Mineral Resources of the H. Comm. on
Natural Resources on H.R. 2295 (May 20, 2015) (statement of Timothy Spisak,
Senior Advisor, Minerals and Realty Management, Bureau of Land Management,
U.S. Dep’t of Interior)).
83. Resp’ts’ Br. in Op. at 16–17.
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Secretary express authority under the Organic Act to secure rights of way
for power lines, telephone lines, and certain “canals, ditches, pipes and
pipe lines, flumes, tunnels, or other water conduits,” but not for pipelines
that carry oil or gas.84
IV. ANALYSIS
This argument involves a narrow issue hinged on technical
statutory construction, precise language, and congressional intent.
However, buried below the legal and legislative clutter lie the broader
issues of state sovereignty and private property interests, which are tied to
the nation’s energy trajectory. As evidenced by the litany of states that
have expressed interest in the case, the Court will ultimately decide
whether the Fourth Circuit’s holding85 implicates overreaching Park
Service authority over other federal agencies, states, and private entities
that currently own or manage national trail components.86 The Court’s
analysis will likely involve a deep dive into the public lands statutes that
consume much of the parties’ arguments; however, Petitioners’ policy
arguments and stated consequences of upholding the Fourth Circuit’s
decision may persuade a majority of the Court to reverse so the pipeline
company can make another attempt at environmental compliance.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

The Court will likely uphold the Fourth Circuit’s decision denying
the Forest Service authority to grant the pipeline a right-of-way across the
Appalachian Trail. The Court’s dicta in Sturgeon v. Frost87 indicates it will
find Respondents’ statutory interpretation persuasive.88 In that case, which
involved the regulation of an Alaskan river through a national park, the
unanimous Court noted “statutory grants of power make no distinctions
based on the ownership of either lands or waters (or lands beneath waters)
. . . rules about mining and solid-waste disposal, for example, apply to all
lands within [national park] system units ‘whether federally or
nonfederally owned.’”89 Sturgeon involved regulations on water, not land,
and was further complicated by the Alaska National Interest Lands
84. Br. for Resp’ts at 7 (quoting 54 U.S.C. § 100902).
85. Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 181 (holding “the Forest Service does
not have statutory authority to grant pipeline rights of way across the
[Appalachian Trail] pursuant to the MLA”).
86. Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs at 32,
Dec. 9, 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587.
87. 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019) (holding non-public lands within Alaska’s
national parks are exempt from the Park Service’s ordinary regulatory authority).
88. Id. at 1076 (“[T]he Secretary, acting through the Director of the
Park Service, has broad authority under the National Park Service Organic Act
(Organic Act), 39 Stat. 535, to administer both lands and waters within all system
units in the country” (citing 54 U.S.C. §§ 100751, 100501, 100102)).
89. Id. (citing 36 C.F.R. §§ 6.2, § 9.2).
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Conservation Act90 (“ANILCA”), but this statement, among others,91
supports broad Park Service authority, which the Court limited in
Sturgeon, only because “Alaska is different.”92
Petitioners’ alarmist claim that the Fourth Circuit’s rule would
suddenly convey all National Park System jurisdiction to the Forest
Service along the Pacific Crest Trail, paving the way for future pipeline
development across it, is unlikely to resonate with the Court. The Trails
Act mandates cross-agency consultation and grants both Secretaries the
authority to negotiate appropriate cooperative management agreements.93
These requirements mean that both Secretaries are empowered and
constrained by the Trails Act, not to mention their respective Organic Acts,
which prescribe limitations on land use that is inconsistent with
Congress’s stated national interests of preservation and enjoyment of
outdoor areas.94 The Forest Service cites the 1971 Pacific Crest Trail
agreement, in which it and the Park Service determined that the trail’s
segments crossing eight national parks and national monuments traverse
lands that should remain under the “administrative jurisdiction[] of . . . the
National Park Service.”95 However, this quote does not support what
Petitioners contend. To the contrary, the document confirms both
Secretaries agreed Park Service authority would best secure the necessary
protection for those parks and the resources therein.96 Considering these
clear statutory safeguards, the Court is likely to find Petitioners’
unintended consequences argument too attenuated.
If the Court sides with Petitioners on the threshold question that
the trail is not “land” under the law, then Respondents’ statutory analysis
fails. However, Petitioners’ position in this regard is problematic as the
Appalachian Trail Conservancy highlights in its amicus brief supporting

90. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2018) (ANILCA provides “protection
for the national interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values
on public lands in Alaska. . . .”).
91. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1080 (“Alaska is often the exception, not
the rule”; “[i]f Sturgeon lived in any other State, his suit would not have a prayer
of success”).
92. Id. at 1069 (quoting Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070
(2016) (“Sturgeon I”).
93. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1246(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
94. See id. § 1241(a); see also id. §§ 1, 475.
95. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 36–37 (citing United States Forest Service,
Comprehensive Management Plan for the Pacific Crest National Scenic Trail
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. App. D, at 1 (1982) https://go.usa.gov/xpKnh).
96. Comprehensive at 2, supra note 104, Characteristics of Pacific
Crest Trail, adopted by Advisory Council May 16, 1980, (“[The] Pacific Crest
National Scenic Trail is . . . located, designed, constructed, and maintained to a
standard commensurate with its National significance, while reflecting the type
and volume of traffic planned: limited by the standards established for special
legislated areas (national parks, national monuments, wilderness, state parks)
through which it passes.”).
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neither party.97 Citing a House Report from 1968 precisely on point, the
Conservancy notes the statute’s use of the term “footpath” means only that
the Appalachian Trail is meant for foot traffic.98
Finally, Petitioners’ argument that there is nothing in the text to
indicate Congress intended to transfer federal land management across the
entire Appalachian Trail might be compelling to those justices who feel
the Court should not be a roadblock to nation-wide development.99 The
Court may decide the Fourth Circuit went too far in denying the Forest
Service authority to grant pipeline rights-of-way under the MLA because
under that reasoning, the MLA would give no federal agency that power.100
However, because Congress has acted in the past to secure rights-of-way
across national park lands, it is unlikely the Court will agree with
Petitioners. In light of the statutory construction, and the high value
Congress placed on the nation’s scenic and historic trails, the Court will
likely find that an act of Congress is both the intended and appropriate path
to natural gas pipeline approval through national parks.
B. State Sovereignty and Private Property Rights
West Virginia and a coalition of sixteen states submitted an
amicus brief in support of Petitioners, warning that to deem all federal land
crossed by the Appalachian Trail as “lands in the National Park System”
would severely limit state and private property rights and inhibit pipeline
development against Congress’s intent at the expense of the states and
national economy.101 The Court is likely to reject this argument on
statutory grounds. The states’ claim, which Atlantic also promotes, that
the Fourth Circuit’s decision could subordinate state agencies that manage
the land across which thousands of miles of national trails traverse is
unfounded because the MLA only applies to “land owned by the United
States,”102 and expressly exempts national park lands from that definition.
The Fourth Circuit’s decision does not constitute uncompensated takings
of state or private land because those lands remain under state or private

97. Br. of Amicus Curiae the Appalachian Trail Conservancy in Sup’t
of None of the Parties at 18, Dec. 9. 2019, No. 18-1584 & 18-1587.
98. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1631, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. at 10 (1968)
(noting that “primarily as a footpath” meant the Trail “primarily” for hikers but
might be appropriate for travel such as horseback riding where such uses were
“accepted and customary”).
99. See Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs
at 25–26.
100. Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs at 21
(“The practical consequences of this decision give life to Congress’s concerns in
1920 and 1973 about undue restrictions on needed energy development.”).
101. Br. of Amici Curiae State of W.Va., et al. in Sup’t of Pet’rs (citing
Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 181).
102. 30 U.S.C. § 185(a), (b)(1).
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ownership and those landowners have and may continue to grant rightsof-way for pipelines under state law.103
Implicating another approach to the state sovereignty debate, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, which sides with Respondents, argues that the
writ of certiorari should be dismissed as Virginia neither needs nor desires
the ACP.104 Virginia contends that the pipeline company’s environmental
record supports its concerns that the pipeline would do more harm than
good to Virginia’s prized national resources and its economy.105 Virginia,
a state with significant coal production,106 attacks Atlantic’s argument that
a massive natural gas pipeline is needed to meet growing energy
demands.107 Citing, among other sources, a 2017 report from the United
States Energy Information Administration, Virginia contends the demand
for natural gas in Virginia and North Carolina is projected to decrease
between 2015 and 2020.108 Interestingly, Virginia’s coal output increased
for the second-straight year in 2018, and Virginia now ranks thirteenth
among the nation’s twenty-four coal-producing states, with a 1.7 percent
share of the national total.109
It is unlikely that the Petitioners’ private property takings
argument will persuade the Court because all of the land along the
Appalachian Trail corridor was obtained through purchase for just
compensation or negotiated land easements and cooperative agreements.
Therefore, the Secretary’s regulatory authority under those respective
agreements, which the Court recognized in Sturgeon110 is significant, is
not suddenly implicated because of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling.
C. Energy and Environmental Implications
Ultimately, the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine
dictates that the judiciary is not the proper branch of government to debate
whether the Atlantic Coast Pipeline is a project worth pursuing—that is a
political debate for Congress. However, should the Court confirm the
103. Br. for Resp’ts at 47.
104. Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 2, Jan. 22, 2020,
No. 18-1584 & 18-1587.
105. Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 8 (“In Virginia
alone, the proposed route crosses three celebrated national features: the George
Washington National Forest, the Blue Ridge Parkway, and the Appalachian Trail
. . . attract[ing] more than three million visitors per year.”).
106. Coal Production in Virginia, VA. DIV. OF GEOLOGY & MINERAL
RES., https://www.dmme.virginia.gov/dgmr/coal.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2020)
(“Mining operations in Virginia produced 13.0 million short tons of coal in 2018
with an estimated market value just over $1.0 billion.”).
107. Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 5.
108. See Br. of Amicus Curiae Va. in Sup’t of Resp’ts at 5–7.
109. Coal Production in Virginia, supra note 112.
110. Sturgeon, 139 S. Ct. at 1076 (“[The] Park Service ‘has broad
authority . . . to administer both lands and waters within all system units,’ and it
sometimes ‘impose[s] major restrictions’ on ‘non federally owned lands’
(frequently called ‘inholdings’) ‘within [System unit] boundaries.’”).
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Fourth Circuit’s holding, the pipeline project’s viability would turn bleak.
Atlantic argues the Fourth Circuit’s decision is a “statutory impediment”
to all pipeline rights-of-way on federal lands.111 The completed ACP
would transport up to 1.5 million dekatherms (about 1.5 billion cubic feet)
of natural gas daily to markets in Virginia and North Carolina for which
the government contends existing infrastructure, renewable energy, and
conservation were not “practical alternatives.”112 Pipeline advocates argue
the Fourth Circuit’s decision is “profoundly wrong, entirely definitive, and
imposes enormous real-world costs.”113 Despite these implications for
pipeline developers, the Court will not likely succumb to Petitioners’
political arguments because such a decision would constitute judicial
intrusion into the operations of the other branches of government.114 As
Respondents argue, “[W]here the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole
function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”115
The Fourth Circuit found clear and consequential deficiencies in
the Forest Service’s evaluation of the ACP’s potential environmental
impacts.116 Notably, the Forest Service altogether failed to follow
established statutory and regulatory mandates, like the duty to explore
alternative routes across vulnerable and valuable federal forest lands.117
Atlantic contends these longstanding statutory protections for land in the
National Park System are “costly and time-consuming.”118 However, the
Court is unlikely to be swayed by the noisy boom of natural gas
development, and should side with the Fourth Circuit and Respondents in
order to protect the national interests recognized by Congress when it
enacted the Trails Act over fifty years ago.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court will likely consider the Appalachian Trail “land” within
the National Park System and uphold the Fourth Circuit’s statutory
interpretation of the Mineral Leasing Act, which prohibits pipeline
development on such land absent express approval by Congress. The
Court’s recent and unanimous support of the strong language in Sturgeon
points to a consensus among the justices that congressional intent behind
federal public land statutes remains a powerful force in safeguarding
national treasures from the demands of irresponsible development.
111. Reply Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 11, Sept. 11, 2019, No. 18-1584 &
18-1587.
112. Br. for Fed. Pet’rs at 13.
113. Reply Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 12.
114. ERWIN CHERMINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 144 (6th ed. 2019).
115. Br. for Resp’ts at 46 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485
(1917)).
116. See Cowpasture, 911 F.3d at 150.
117. Id. at 168.
118. Reply Br. for Pet’r Atlantic at 12.

